Secure by Design Pledge progress report.

Last updated: August 24, 2026

We signed CISA's Secure by Design Pledge, a voluntary commitment to seven goals covering authentication, default credentials, vulnerability classes, patching, disclosure, CVE transparency, and audit logging. The pledge asks signatories to publicly document where they stand. This page is that document.

Our name is on CISA's public signer list, so you do not have to take our word for the signature. The rest of this page is the part that actually matters: what we do, stated plainly enough that your security reviewer can check it.

The short version is that security in Manage1to1 is not a pricing tier. MFA, single sign-on, and audit logs are in the baseline product at every tier, because charging districts extra for the controls that protect student data is the practice this pledge exists to end.

The seven goals

Where we stand on each one.

CISA asks signatories who already meet a goal to describe how. Each entry below states the goal, our status, and the specifics behind it.

1

Multi-factor authentication

Met

CISA goal: Measurably increase the use of MFA across the manufacturer’s products.

Every administrator account supports time-based one-time password (TOTP) multi-factor authentication from any standard authenticator app, so districts are not locked into one vendor. Enrollment secrets and recovery codes are protected at rest and are never redisplayed after setup.

District administrators can require MFA across their entire organization, so enrollment is not left to individual discretion. This is the control CISA points to as the strongest version of this goal: enforcement at the organization level rather than a per-user suggestion.

We also support standards-based single sign-on in the baseline product at no additional cost, through Google Workspace, Microsoft 365 and Entra ID, ClassLink, and SAML 2.0 for identity providers including Okta, OneLogin, ADFS, Ping, and Shibboleth. Districts that already enforce phishing-resistant MFA at their identity provider inherit that posture in Manage1to1 without buying an upgraded tier.

2

Default passwords

Met

CISA goal: Reduce or eliminate default passwords across the manufacturer’s products.

Manage1to1 ships no default passwords. There is no universally shared credential present across installations, which is the specific pattern CISA defines as a default password, and there is no documented break-glass account for support staff to use.

Administrator credentials are created per district during provisioning, and only the district ends up holding them. Passwords are never stored in a form we can reverse, so we cannot read, recover, or disclose one. Districts can enforce their own password policy rather than inheriting ours, and password resets use short-lived, single-use links.

Programmatic access follows the same rule. API keys are displayed to the administrator exactly once and are not recoverable afterward, including by us. A credential we cannot retrieve is a credential we cannot leak.

3

Reducing entire classes of vulnerability

Met, ongoing

CISA goal: Enable a measurable reduction in the prevalence of one or more vulnerability classes.

The class we have committed to eliminating structurally is SQL injection.

Database access runs through a centralized data-access layer that parameterizes values by default. The design goal is structural rather than procedural: developers do not have to remember to escape input, because the safe path is the default path and constructing an unsafe query requires deliberate effort that stands out in review. Request input never reaches a query as anything other than a bound parameter.

We apply the same approach to cross-site scripting, where untrusted markup is sanitized against an allowlist and template output is escaped at render time by default. Our application also runs on a memory-safe runtime, so the memory-safety vulnerability classes CISA highlights do not apply to our application code.

This goal is marked ongoing rather than finished on purpose. Eliminating a vulnerability class is a property you maintain, not a milestone you pass.

4

Security patches

Met

CISA goal: Measurably increase the installation of security patches by customers.

Manage1to1 is delivered exclusively as SaaS over HTTPS. We apply security patches ourselves, centrally, and districts take no action to receive them. CISA names this outcome directly in its example approaches for this goal: for cloud and SaaS products, apply patches so the burden is not on the customer.

There is no unsupported version running in the field, because there is no version for a district to run. We use calendar versioning and every customer is on the current release at all times. Updates are included at every pricing tier with no maintenance contract and no long-term-support upsell, and release notes are published publicly.

Automated vulnerability scanning runs continuously against the platform and its infrastructure, which is how patch-worthy issues reach us in the first place.

5

Vulnerability disclosure policy

Met

CISA goal: Publish a VDP that authorizes public testing and commits to no legal action for good-faith research.

Our Responsible Disclosure Policy authorizes good-faith security testing by members of the public, commits us to not pursuing or recommending legal action against researchers who follow it, provides a dedicated reporting channel, and allows for coordinated public disclosure.

The policy is also published in machine-readable form as a security.txt file so researchers can find it without hunting through our site, which is the discoverability step CISA calls out under this goal.

6

CVEs

Met, ongoing

CISA goal: Demonstrate transparency in vulnerability reporting, with accurate CWE and CPE fields.

We commit to issuing CVEs in a timely manner for any critical or high-impact vulnerability in Manage1to1 that either requires action by a district to remediate or shows evidence of active exploitation, with accurate CWE and CPE fields in every record.

We want to be precise about what that means for a SaaS product rather than overstate it. Because districts run no Manage1to1 software of their own, the ordinary remediation path is that we patch centrally and no customer action is required, so the customer-action trigger above is rarely met. That is a property of the delivery model, not evidence of a clean record, and it is why we pair this commitment with direct written notification to affected districts and with the 72-hour breach notification commitment in our Data Security and Privacy Plan.

7

Evidence of intrusions

Met

CISA goal: Provide customers the artifacts and capabilities to gather evidence of intrusions.

Audit logging is part of the baseline product at every pricing tier, not a premium add-on and not a separate observability SKU. Administrators can review activity across configuration changes, administrator sign-ins including federated SSO logins, user and device record changes, and access to business-relevant data such as tickets, assets, and invoices.

Logs are retained for the life of the district's contract at no additional charge. CISA's example for cloud and SaaS providers is a set retention window such as six months; we do not expire audit history on a rolling window, so a district investigating an incident is not racing a retention clock.

On termination, district data including audit history is available for full export to CSV for 30 days before secure deletion.

Scope and honesty

What this report does and does not claim.

This report covers the Manage1to1 platform, which is delivered solely as SaaS over HTTPS. We do not ship on-premises software, self-hosted builds, or IoT devices, so those categories are out of scope.

The pledge is voluntary and CISA does not enforce, audit, or verify adherence to it. Signing is not a certification, and no statement on this page should be read as a CISA endorsement of Manage1to1. The independently verified items in our security posture are the hosting certifications, which are listed on our Security and Compliance page.

You will notice this report describes controls without naming the specific libraries, frameworks, or versions behind them. That is deliberate. Publishing a component inventory would hand an attacker a shortlist of known issues to try against districts, and no district benefits from that. Customers and prospects under a mutual NDA can request deeper architectural detail, and district security reviewers can send us their questionnaire directly.

We will revise this page as our posture changes rather than leaving a stale snapshot up. If you believe something here is inaccurate, we would genuinely like to know: tell us through the Responsible Disclosure Policy or at security@manage1to1.com.